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#### Examples, Statistics and Failure modes of tailings dams and consequence of failure

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## Outline

- 1. Recent tailings dam failures and 'statistical' review
- **2. Introduction to Failure Modes**
- 3. Consequence of failure classification and Risk Assessment (quick mention)

42 slides in 25 mins = Let's go!!

"For any engineer to judge a dam stable for the long-term simply because it has been apparently stable for a long period of time is, without any other substantiation, a potentially catastrophic error in judgment"

(Szymanski and Davies(2004): "Tailings Dams - Design Criteria and Safety Evaluations at Closure" -BC Reclamation symposium)



### Definitions

• Tailings, also called mine dumps, culm dumps, slimes, tails, refuse, leach residue or slickens:

are the materials left over after the process of separating the valuable fraction from the uneconomic fraction (gangue) of an ore.



\*schematic not representative of all facilities



## **Recent tailings dam failures**

Can anyone name the most recent major tailings dam failure?



## **Recent tailings dam failures**

Nope...not Mt. Polley



Brazil Tailings Dam Failure: Herculano, Itabirite – Sept 11, 2014

3 deaths confirmed (very limited public information)



# What about before that?

Nope...still not Mt. Polley

August 18, 2014 – "Just last week, a massive tailings dam failed at the Buenavista del Cobre mine in Canenea, Sonora, and dumped 40 million liters of copper sulfate into the Rio Sonora. Mexican authorities are blaming the mine's owners, Southern Copper Corp., a subsidiary of Grupo México."



Source: http://www.rosemontminetruth.com/?p=3749





## **Recent tailings dam failures**

Imperial Metals – Mount Polley – Likely, BC – August 4, 2014





#### July 24, 2014 to August 5, 2014

Source: <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount\_Polley\_mine\_disaster</u>





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the early morning of 4 August 2014<sup>[2]</sup> when the Mount Polley tailings pond partially breached, releasing 10 million cubic metres of water and 4.5 million cubic metres<sup>[2]</sup> of slurry into Polley Lake.<sup>[3]</sup> The tailings pond covers four square kilometres and by 8 August according to Brian Kynoch, president of Imperial Metals, [3] the owner of the Mount Polley copper and gold mine,[4] the tailings pond was "virtually empty."<sup>(4)[2]</sup> The contaminated slurry carrying felled trees, mud and debris "scoured away the banks" of Hazeltine Creek which flows out of Polley Lake and continued into the nearby Quesnel Lake. The spill caused Polley Lake to rise by 1.5 metres (4.9 ft).[4] Hazeltine Creek was transformed from a 2-metre-wide (6.6 ft) stream to a 50-metre-across (160 ft) "wasteland."<sup>[5]</sup> Cariboo Creek was also affected.<sup>[2]</sup> The spill has been called one of the biggest environmental disasters in modern Canadian history. [6][7][8]

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The Mount Polley mine disaster is an environmental disaster in the Cariboo region of British Columbia, Canada, that began in

Contents [hide] 1 Local state of emergency 2 Response and investigation 2.1 Pollution Abatement Order 2.2 Control and remediation 2.3 Environmental monitoring and impacts **3 Imperial Metals** 4 Toxicity of effluents 5 Citations 6 References

#### Mount Polley mine disaster









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# Last major mine spills in Canada?

Picture of a 100 km long leak of coal mine sludge, making its way down the Athabasca River. This photo taken on Nov. 11 or 12, near the confluence of the Lesser Slave River. One billion litres of sludge leaked from the closed Obed Mountain Mine near Hinton on Oct. 31, 2013





# Last major mine spills in Canada?

- There were 46 "dangerous or unusual occurrences" at tailings ponds at mines across B.C. between 2000 and 2012, according to annual reports of B.C's chief inspector of mines <u>http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Liberals+keeping+dangerous+occurre</u> <u>nces+tailings+ponds+secret/10131898/story.html#ixzz3YcCrZRng</u>
- Cliff's Resources:
  - Fined \$7.5M for release from Bloom Lake tailings ponds in Quebec
  - Breach of the Triangle Tailings Pond dam and a separate release of 14,500 litres of ferric sulfate into water frequented by fish
  - <u>http://www.netnewsledger.com/2014/12/26/7-5-million-dollar-fine-for-</u> <u>cliffs-natural-resources-general-partner/#sthash.hWF2mgaK.dpuf</u>







#### Chronology of major tailings dam failures

(from 1960)

(last updated 18 May 2015)

Note: Due to limited availability of data, this compilation is in no way complete

| Date                    | Location  | Parent company                                | Ore type              | Type of Incident  | Release  |
|-------------------------|---|---|-----------------------|---|--|
| 2014,<br>Sep. 10        | Herculano mine, Itabirito,<br>Região Central, Minas<br>Gerais, Brazil             | <u>Hercu</u> ano Mineração Ltda B•            | iron                  | tailings dam failure  | 2  |
| 2014,<br>Aug. 7         | Buenavista del Cobre<br>mine, Cananea, Sonora,<br>Mexico                          | South m Copper Corp. B+<br>(Grup ) México B+) | copper                | tailings dam failure  | 40,000 m <sup>3</sup> of copper sulphate   |
| 2014,<br>Aug. 4         | Mount Polley mine, near<br>Likely, Beitish Columbia,<br>Canada                    | Imper al Metais Corp. 10                      | copper, goid          | tailings dam failure due to foundation failure (view details)   | 7.3 million m <sup>3</sup> of tailings, 10.6<br>water, and 6.5 million m <sup>3</sup> of int |
| 2014,<br>Feb. 2         | Dan River Steam Station,<br>Eden, North Carolina,<br>USA                          | Duke nergy =+                                 | coal ash              | collapse of an old drainage pipe under a 27-acre ash waste pond | about 82,000 short tons [74,40<br>coal ash and 27 million gallons<br>of contaminated water   |
| 2013,<br>Nov. 15-<br>19 | Zangezur Copper<br>Molybdenum Combine e-,<br>Kajaran, Syunik province,<br>Armenia | Cronimet Mining AG a                          | copper, molybdenum    | damage of tailings pipeline                                     | 2  |
| 2013,<br>Oct. 31        | Obed Mountain Coal<br>Mine, northeast of<br>Hinton, Alberta, Canada               | Sherritt International B+                     | coal                  | breach of wall in containment pond                              | spill of 670,000 m <sup>3</sup> of coal was<br>90,000 tonnes of muddy sedim                  |
| 2012,<br>Dec. 17        | former Gullbridge mine<br>site, New foundland,<br>Canada                          |   | copper                | embankment dam failure, width 50 m                              |  |
| 2012                    | Satlama Vainuu  | Tabritana Mining Company Bla                  | nistral (nenainen her |   | hundrada of thousands of subic   |

#### Worst of all time?

## Stava, Italy

At 12h:22':55" on 19th July 1985 the bank of the upper basin gave way and collapsed onto the lower basin, which, too, collapsed. The muddy mass composed of sand, slime and water moved downhill at a velocity approaching 90 km/h, killing people and destroying trees, buildings and everything in its path, until it reached the river Avisio. Few of those hit by this wave of destruction survived.

Along its path, the mud killed 268 people and completely destroyed 3 hotels, 53 homes, and six industrial buildings; 8 bridges were demolished and 9 buildings were seriously damaged. A thick layer of mud measuring between 20 and 40 centimetres in thickness covered an overall 435,000 square metres over 4.2 kilometres.

Approximately 180,000 cubic metres of material poured out of the dams. A further 40,000 - 50,000 cubic metres came from erosion, buildings demolished by the flow and hundreds of uprooted trees.

The July 19th 1985 disaster in the Stava valley was the most tragic of its kind. With its toll of 268 lives lost and 155 million Euros in damage, it was one of the worst industrial catastrophes in the world.



Stava Monument



http://www.tailings.info/casestudies/stava.htm

## **Statistics?**

Source: ICOLD, 2001



Some quick statistics regarding tailings dam failures (~221):

- Approximately 3,500 tailings dam worldwide
- 1970-2001 annually 2 to 5 <u>major</u> tailings dam failures (we don't often hear about the minor failures)

#### Key Point – Annual rate of failure: 1:700 to 1:750

Knowing these statistics, a couple interesting questions:

- What is the life span of your facility?
- (number of facilities) x (age) ?







Source: **Azam, Li** – "Tailings Dam Failures – A review of the last 100 years" Geotechnical News – December 2010

"For a world inventory of 18401 mine sites, the failure rate over the last one hundred years is estimated to be 1.2%"



Figure 1. Failure events over time.





Figure 2.1 Increasing Severity of TSF Failures Globally 1940-2010

#### "Risk potential has increased by a factor of 20 every 1/3 century." (Robertson 2011 – Tailings and Mine Waste Conference, Keynote Address)



## **Statistics?**



| Failure rate of different dam types from 1831 to 1965* |                         |                                  |                     |      |  |  |  |  |
|--|-------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|------|--|--|--|--|
| Dam Type   | Number of<br>Dams Built | Number of<br>Dams that<br>Failed | Failure Rate<br>(%) | odds |  |  |  |  |
| Embankment   |                         |                                  |                     |      |  |  |  |  |
| Soil   | 4551                    | 121                              | 2.66%               | 2/75 |  |  |  |  |
| Rock   | 285                     | 13                               | 4.56%               | 1/22 |  |  |  |  |
| Total  | 4836                    | 134                              | 2.77%               | 1/36 |  |  |  |  |
|  |                         |                                  |                     |      |  |  |  |  |
| Concrete   |                         |                                  |                     |      |  |  |  |  |
| Arch   | 566                     | 7                                | 1.24%               | 1/81 |  |  |  |  |
| Buttress   | 373                     | 7                                | 1.88%               | 1/53 |  |  |  |  |
| Gravity  | 2271                    | 40                               | 1.76%               | 1/57 |  |  |  |  |
| Total  | 3210                    | 54                               | 1.68%               | 1/59 |  |  |  |  |
|  |                         |                                  |                     |      |  |  |  |  |
| <b>Combined Total</b>                                  | 8046                    | 188                              | 2.34%               | 1/43 |  |  |  |  |

\* Reproduced from Cenderelli, 2000

Cenderelli, D.A. (2000). Floods from natural and artificial dam failures. In: Wohl, *Inland Flood Hazards: human, riparian, and aquatic communities* (pp 73-103). New York: Cambridge University Press



#1 – Slope Stability#2 – Seismic

#3 – Overtopping

Source: ICOLD, 2001

Analysis of failures between 1970-2001





## So what's the message??

'Empirical' Statistics are interesting, but how do we change them?

Mining Association of Canada Guidelines Canadian Dam Association Guidelines

Qualified Persons? Engineer of Record?

Failure Modes Analysis and Consequence of Failure (Risk)









# **Contributing Factors for Mode of Failure**

#### Design / Construction

- Dam type
- Materials
- Hydrology/hydrogeology
- Construction
- Outlet Structures
- Freeboard
- Foundation/ Abutments
- Chemical processes
- Biological Processes

#### Operation / Maintenance

- Rate of deposition
- Water Management
- Inspection / Monitoring
- **Maintenance**
- Chemical processes
- Biological processes

#### **External Factors**

- Human Activity
- Climate/weather
- Seismic activity
- Earth movement
- Onforeseen

### ...a partial list





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-Highest point in dyke?
-Centreline construction
-Recent raise
-Aligned of natural channel
-Repose angle slopes
-overtopping initiated by
foundation slope instability

Tailing



Slope Failure

EMBANKMENT FOUNDATION Fos Undetected Too LOW = 1.3 Insufficient clay Layer High Pro babilit Construction Failur Misinterpreted Material Strength Not Code Too Steep Compliant Low Strength no Berm BREACH MEM Says Water Covered Limited Analysis Too Close to Perimeler Too much water No Drying Insufficient Freeboard Failure to Still Discharge Fluid Too Big Excess THUNGS WATER BALANCE Pool



Slope Failure

Foundation Failure

Transcona Grain Elevator, near Winnipeg, Manitoba (analogous)



Built in 1913 Started filling with grain September 1913

October 19, 1913 27° tilt toward the west



Surface Erosion



Merriespruit Tailings Dam <u>Overtopping</u> Failure, Virginia, South Africa, February 22, 1994 50 mm of rain fell in 30 minutes; 17 people killed, 80 houses destroyed





Internal Erosion

#### 1976 FAILURE OF TETON DAM – IDAHO

- -Failed during filling of dam -80 billion gallons – 300 million cubic meters
- -200 residences destroyed
- -14 deaths
- -1 billion dollars in damage

































## **CDA***+***<b>ACB**

**Consequence of Failure** 

### Table 2-1 (CDA Dam Safety Guidelines)

My recommendation: Incorporate 'Likelihood' to develop Risk Assessment

> Consider: Direct vs. Indirect Consequences

| -           | T                                 |                          |   |   |  |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---|--|
| Dam class   | Population<br>at risk<br>[note 1] | Loss of life<br>[note 2] | Environmental and cultural<br>values  | Infrastructure and<br>economics   |  |
| Low         | None                              | 0                        | Minimal short-term loss<br>No long-term loss  | Low economic losses; area<br>contains limited<br>infrastructure or services   |  |
| Significant | Temporary<br>only                 | Unspecified              | No significant loss or<br>deterioration of fish or wildlife<br>habitat<br>Loss of marginal habitat only<br>Restoration or compensation in<br>kind highly possible | Losses to recreational<br>facilities, seasonal<br>workplaces, and<br>infrequently used<br>transportation routes   |  |
| High        | Permanent                         | 10 or fewer              | Significant loss or deterioration<br>of <i>important</i> fish or wildlife<br>habitat<br>Restoration or compensation in<br>kind highly possible                    | High economic losses<br>affecting infrastructure,<br>public transportation, and<br>commercial facilities  |  |
| Very high   | Permanent                         | 100 or fewer             | Significant loss or deterioration<br>of <i>critical</i> fish or wildlife habitat<br>Restoration or compensation in<br>kind possible but impractical               | Very high economic<br>losses affecting important<br>infrastructure or services<br>(e.g., highway, industrial<br>facility, storage facilities<br>for dangerous substances) |  |
| Extreme     | Permanent                         | More than<br>100         | Major loss of <i>critical</i> fish or<br>wildlife habitat<br>Restoration or compensation in<br>kind impossible  | Extreme losses affecting<br>critical infrastructure or<br>services (e.g., hospital,<br>major industrial complex,<br>major storage facilities for<br>dangerous substances) |  |

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Note 1. Definitions for population at risk:

None—There is no identifiable population at risk, so there is no possibility of loss of life other than through unforeseeable misadventure.

**Temporary**—People are only temporarily in the dam-breach inundation zone (e.g., seasonal cottage use, passing through on transportation routes, participating in recreational activities).

**Permanent**—The population at risk is ordinarily located in the dam-breach inundation zone (e.g., as permanent residents); three consequence classes (high, very high, extreme) are proposed to allow for more detailed estimates of potential loss of life (to assist in decision-making if the appropriate analysis is carried out).

Note 2. Implications for loss of life:

**Unspecified**—The appropriate level of safety required at a dam where people are temporarily at risk depends on the number of people, the exposure time, the nature of their activity, and other conditions. A higher class could be appropriate, depending on the requirements. However, the design flood requirement, for example, might not be higher if the temporary population is not likely to be present during the flood season.



## Summary

#### • Tailings dams continue to fail around the world

- Mother nature is working to make the world flat
- Dykes conditions are constantly changing (think of watching your kids growing)
- Many failure modes exist
  - Physical, Environmental, Functional
- Consequence of Failure
  - Can be separated from likelihood
  - Risk based (including probability/likelihood) allows for increased ability to manage failure modes
  - Recommended: Use FMEA with Risk assessment to drive priority identification for facility management
  - Recommended: Follow the MAC and CDA guidelines, statistics will be reduced



### References

- International Committee on Large Dams (ICOLD), 2001, Tailings Dams Risk of Dangerous Occurrences, Bulletin 121.
- Canadian Dam Association (CDA), 2007, Dam Safety
- Canadian Dam Association (CDA), 2014, Application of Dam Safety Guidelines to Mining Dams





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